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The Root Cause of Instability in the Balkans:  
Ethnic Hatred or Trans-Border Crime? 
 
Introduction 
 
The 1990s were marked by the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and a number of wars and 
ethnic conflicts in its successor states. This led countless experts to try to explain how and 
why did this happen. Three most common theories, which appeared were the theory about 
"ancient hatreds" between the Yugoslav nations, the theory about the political elites, who 
destroyed Yugoslavia to grab power in the successor states, and the theory about the total 
breakdown of socialist regime, which led to the outbreak of hostilities. What all these theories 
have in common is that they all view nationalism as the driving force behind the conflicts and 
that they, consequently, describe the conflicts and wars as ethnic conflicts.  
 This paper will argue that the root cause of instability and violence on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia is neither nationalism nor ethnic hatred, but crime. Specifically, what 
pushed former Yugoslavia into a succession of bloody wars was the symbiosis between 
authorities and organized crime during the process of creation of new states, which led to a 
permanent transformation of state/national interests into private ones, fostering the 
development of corrupt, non-transparent and crime-permeated societies.  
Countless episodes and events, documented by numerous authors, researchers and, 
most importantly, the UN Commission of Experts, which compiled thousands of pages of 
material about the war, demonstrate that the driving force behind the destruction of 
Yugoslavia was not nationalism, but greed. Nationalism is a powerful force, which indeed 
fuels many wars, but its ability to ignite a war in the first place should be seriously 
questioned. In the case of Yugoslavia, nationalism was rather used as a mask under which a 
thorough criminalization of post-Yugoslav societies was hidden. War provided the perfect 
smoke screen behind which the ruling elites and the criminal underworld, hand in hand, 
grabbed total political and economic power in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. It diverted the attention of the general public to the threat, coming from the 
demonised "other" (Croat, Serb, or Muslim) for as long as possible, or better said, for as long 
as there was something left to rob.  
 Despite the extreme nationalism and increased ethnic distrust, which engulfed 
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, the war would not have broken out without gangs of criminals 
actually starting with their "kill, steal and burn" campaign. The money, made through sales of 
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the "war booty," sanction-breaking, arms selling, oil smuggling, extortion and racketeering in 
besieged cities, "taxes" and "duties" imposed on the passage of humanitarian convoys and 
fees collected for the evacuation of refugees were much more important to those who started 
and led the war than were some alleged nationalistic goals. The best proof that profit-making 
and not nationalism was the prime mover during the war is the fact that all warring sides 
extensively traded with each other throughout the war, weapons, ammunition and oil being 
the most common objects of trade.  
 The virtually unchecked growth of organized crime in the war-ridden Western 
Balkans had its impact also on other countries in the peninsula. The connection between 
events in the former Yugoslavia and trans-border crime in the Balkans was most clearly 
visible during the trade and arms embargoes, imposed by the UN on post-Yugoslav states. 
The embargo-violating trade has fostered the development of the regional net of smuggling 
channels, with the organized crime structures in countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Albania 
playing a crucial role in the process.  
   
 
Theories Explaining the Dissolution of Yugoslavia 
 
There are three main types of theories. All of them offer some valuable insight and two of 
them very convincingly explain what were the reasons and conditions, which made the 
Yugoslav break-up possible, but all of them make the same mistake by listing nationalism as 
the force behind it.  
 
The most infamous theory is the one about "ancient hatreds," which basically claims that the 
nations of former Yugoslavia have hated each other since time immemorial and have always 
been at each other's throats. The "ancient hatreds" theory is completely defenceless if 
juxtaposed against any objective historic account of the peoples of former Yugoslavia. Yet, it 
is important to consider it since, its incompatibility with facts notwithstanding, it was widely 
used by Serbian and Croatian war-propaganda machinery, fuelled by respectively Serbian 
myth of genocidal Croats and Croatian myth of Serbs, always plotting to subjugate the Croats.  
Nevertheless, its simplifying black and white lenses hardly offer any valuable insight 
into the complexities of the Yugoslav war. At different times during the war, Serbs fought 
against Croats, then Serbs against Croats and Muslims, then Croats assisted by Serbs fought 
against Muslims, and lastly, Muslims fought other Muslims (government forces fought 
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against the forces of Fikret Abdic, who proclaimed autonomy of "his" Cazinska Krajina). 
Serbs betraying other Serbs (Milosevic abandoning the Bosnian Serbs) is also irreconcilable 
with the picture this theory presents. 
  
The second, much more credible theory blames the political elites for the destruction of 
Yugoslavia. The elites used nationalism to break up the federation in order to first grab and 
then consolidate their power in Yugoslavia's successor states. War rallied "their" ethnic 
groups -- the nations of the newly formed nation-states -- behind them. The elites spread their 
propaganda through the controlled media, manipulating the public and convincing them that 
they should sacrifice their personal welfare for the sake of their nation's survival. By 
provoking a conflict, the elites managed to deflect demands for a political change. The 
opposition was silenced since any attempt to challenge the status quo could be and was 
described as a threat to the national interests.  
Despite being correct in principle, this theory leaves many questions unanswered. The 
majority of Yugoslav citizens were well educated, well travelled and rational people, with 
access to international media. They worked and studied with, befriended and even married 
members of other ethnic groups. How was it possible that so many of them really believed 
that Ustashe were on the loose again, or that the Islamic fundamentalists were waging a jihad 
in Bosnia? How could normal people have turned into vicious killers? In fact, propaganda 
was a necessary, but far from sufficient condition to push Yugoslavia into war. The 
manipulation of the elites can work only if certain preconditions exist. These preconditions 
are in the center of the third theory. 
   
The third theory locates the causes for the war in the political, economic and social 
breakdown of the Yugoslav socialist regime. The standard of living was deteriorating, 
unemployment was rising, hyperinflation seemed unstoppable, the regime was corrupt and the 
political system exhausted. This situation made the majority of people prone to believe that 
"someone" was exploiting them, that they were being treated unjustly and that something 
radical had to be done to change this. The continuously worsening economic conditions 
intensified the quarrels between the republican leaderships and the federal government over 
the federal budget, taxation, and jurisdiction over foreign trade and investment. In 
democracies, such a situation would be dealt with by a normal competition between various 
political parties proposing various solutions. In Yugoslavia, which was highly decentralised, 
but ruled by only one party, the situation instead pushed the republican elites into a struggle to 
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save and control their own piece of economic pie from rotting away with the rest of the 
decaying federation. This in turn accelerated the worsening of the crises. The result was a 
complete breakdown of the social and political order, and the rise of nationalism.  
 At first glance, there seems to be hardly anything to criticise regarding this theory. 
What this theory forgets is that even such extreme circumstances are not enough to push a 
country into a war. Disliking or hating members of another ethnic group and actually killing 
them are still worlds apart, separated by an enormous step not too many people are generally 
ready, willing or able to make. Yugoslavs were not an exception. Wars, the Yugoslav one 
included, do not "just happen," even if all circumstances and preconditions are such to make 
the war seem almost inevitable.  
 
 
Ethnic War or Criminal Rampage? 
 
A popular misconception regarding the war is that a large majority of Yugoslav people was 
actually ready to go and fight. Serbia is probably the best example, since the Serbian side can 
be justifiably accused of being the one, which spilled the first blood. Especially in large cities 
in Serbia and in the whole of Vojvodina, unpopularity of the war among ordinary Serbs and 
their reluctance to participate became clear almost in the very beginning. Less than half of the 
Serbian reservists appeared, when they were ordered to report for duty. In Belgrade, less than 
15 per cent did so.1 The conscripts often staged mutinies, refusing to go to the front. The 
independent weekly Vreme was full of stories about Serb units being driven without a leader 
into Croatia and then getting lost in the cornfields of Slavonia.2 General Veljko Kadijevic, the 
Federal Defence Minister between 1988 and 1992, complained during the Slavonian 
campaign in autumn 1991 that a large number of troops, which reached the front, used the 
first opportunity to abandon it.3 During the attack on Vukovar, officers complained that their 
soldiers disobeyed orders and refused to leave the safety of their armoured vehicles.  
During the course of the war, more than 150,000 Serbs emigrated or went into hiding 
to avoid being drafted.4 If Milosevic and his associates wanted the war to really take off, 
something had to be changed immediately. Instead of unwilling and ineffective regular 
                                                          
1 John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,''' in International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, summer 2000, p. 48. 
2 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 269-270.  
3 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997, p. 185. 
4 Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,''' pp. 47-48. 
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soldiers, paramilitary criminal gangs were sent to the front, unleashing hell, and at last, 
making the war possible. 
 According to the findings of the UN Commission, a large majority of the crimes 
committed in the course of the campaigns of ethnic cleansing were carried out by the most 
marginal elements of society, who formed numerous paramilitary units. They were 
influenced, encouraged and armed by their political leaders, who used aggressive nationalism, 
historic grievances and desire for revenge for that purpose.5 However, the importance of 
possible material gains as a motivating factor was exceptional, as it will be shown later in this 
paper.  
Most of the fighting, especially on Serbian and to a slightly smaller extent on Croatian 
and Bosnian Muslim side has been done by paramilitary units. The UN Commission 
identified 83 paramilitary units, operating during the war. Though most of them consisted of 
armed local men, who grabbed arms after becoming prey to the aggressive nationalist 
propaganda, a very significant element in all of them represented members of the criminal 
underworld and convicts, released from prisons exactly for the purpose of participation in 
these units.6  
 Using the findings of the UN Commission, one has a reason to conclude that the 
conflict was far from being an uncontrollable and unstoppable ethnic war, involving four to 
five million people.7 Instead, it rather resembled a criminal rampage of no more than 66,000 
thugs. When Croatian and Bosnian authorities managed to root out or at least significantly 
diminish the paramilitary presence on their side and build up a real, disciplined and trained 
army, the Serbian defences in Croatia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina collapsed like a house 
of cards, when the Croatian-Muslim counter-offensive started. A presumption that a timely, 
effective and determined international intervention would bring the conflict to a quick end, 
and that it would represent militarily a far lesser problem than the international community, 
for political reasons, fancied to believe, is therefore well in place.8 
The ordinary people, regardless of their nationality unwillingly came to be controlled 
and victimised by small bands of armed thugs. These gangs, most often consisting of people 
with criminal background, were recruited by political leaders, who needed the war to preserve 
                                                          
5 United Nations Commission of Experts, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Part III: General Studies, Section B: Ethnic 
Cleansing, available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/REPORT_TOC.HTM  
6 Ibid.  
7 According to the 1991 census, the combined population of Serbs, Croats and Muslims was around 15.7 million 
of which, men of fighting age amounted to at least four to five millions. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 316-317. 
8 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 30. 
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their political positions for as long as possible. Without the gangs, roaming around and 
terrorising people, the outbreak of a conflict of such a scale as we witnessed could not be 
possible. Since the gangs were terrorising predominantly the people of different ethnic origin 
-- the people who did not represent the newly formed power bases of their bosses -- the war 
came to be seen as a war between different nations, and not as a campaign of terror performed 
by a limited number of criminal gangs it actually was.  
The war in former Yugoslavia was therefore not really an ethnic war. "Serbs," 
"Croats" and "Muslims" were not engaged in a conflict where each and every member of one 
ethnic group was fighting against all members of another group. In fact, quite often, members 
of a particular ethnic group played a very significant role in fighting on the side of the 
"enemy" ethnic group or even committing atrocities against people of the same ethnicity. 
Jovan Divjak, a Serb, was a Deputy Commander of the Bosnian government army throughout 
the war.9 One of the most notorious and vicious paramilitary gangs, operating in support of 
the Croatian government, was lead by Jusuf "Juka" Prazina, a Muslim. His gang committed 
crimes against both Serbs and Muslims, and ran a concentration camp for both ethnic 
groups.10 Drazen Erdemovic, a Serb who participated in the massacre in Srebrenica and who 
surrendered to the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague testified that his unit, which killed more 
than a thousand unarmed civilians in a village of Pilici included Croats, Slovenes and 
Muslims.11  
 Perhaps the most illustrative example of what the Yugoslav wars were all about is a 
paramilitary unit called "Vikendasi" (The Weekenders). They would gather on Friday 
afternoons, grab their arms and make short raids from Serbian held territory into parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina under control of Sarajevo government, looting, plundering and 
vandalising villages and isolated farms. By Sunday evening, they would cease and return to 
their homes, selling the stolen goods during the "working week."12 "Vatreni konji" (The 
Horses of Fire) was a Croatian gang, consisting of 58 men, who became notorious for their 
sexual crimes. They would rampage through unprotected Serbian villages, looting property, 
raping and killing. They also took numerous women as captives and held them as sex slaves, 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p. 17. 
10 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part II: Major Special Forces Working in 
Support of the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and 
the So-called "Bosnian Serb Republic" and "Serb Republic of Krajina," Section C: Paramilitaries Operating in 
Support of the Croatian Government.   
11 Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia. New York: Penguin Books, 
1999, p. 340. 
12 Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,''' p. 50. 
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making money from their suffering.13 During the ethnic cleansing of Bosanski Novi, a 
paramilitary gang called "Rezervna rebra" (The Spare Ribs) took control, raiding Muslim and 
Croat owned cafes, shops, restaurants and private homes. After two weeks of rampage in 
which many people were arbitrary killed, the Spare Ribs announced that transportation would 
be organised to take all non-Serbs to Croatia. However, before being allowed to leave, all 
people had to sign over their property to the newly established Serbian authorities. When the 
buses for evacuation finally arrived, those allowed to leave faced the final insult, being forced 
to pay outrageously expensive "bus tickets."14  
 A unit lead by Dragan Vasiljkovic, popularly known as Captain Dragan rose to 
"prominence" during the war in Croatia. Vasiljkovic was a pimp in Sidney and a military 
instructor in Tanzania and Angola, before sensing an opportunity to make considerable 
money in his former homeland. When the influx of money started to dry out by January 1993, 
Captain Dragan packed his bags and disappeared.15 The Final Report of the UN Commission 
of Experts is literally packed with references to numerous other criminal groups, "fighting" on 
all three sides.16  
 
A war, in which the normal civil order is completely destroyed and the only law 
acknowledged is the law of guns, offers exceptional opportunities to well-organised criminal 
gangs. Apart from looting, there is money to be made through extortion and racketeering, 
through "duties" and "taxes" imposed on passage of humanitarian convoys and on evacuation 
of refuges, through arms trade, through performance of paid military services for the official 
"enemy," through forced prostitution, through black market in the besieged cities and through 
holding prisoners for ransom. UN Commission of Experts lists looting, theft, and robbery of 
private property, as well as forced expropriation of real property as elements of the organised 
campaign of ethnic cleansing.17 But the scope, persistence and, above all, the demoralising 
effect of these criminal activities, which seriously undermined the alleged war objectives 
show that those who engaged in them followed an agenda of their own.  
                                                          
13 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part III: Other Identified Paramilitary 
Groups. 
14 Judah, The Serbs, pp. 226-228. 
15 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part III: Other Identified Paramilitary 
Groups.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Part III: General Studies, Section B: Ethnic Cleansing. 
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 A "military" action of a paramilitary gang usually followed a pattern, which could be, 
as Mueller proposes, divided into four stages. He names them take-over, carnival, revenge, 
and occupation and desertion.18 
1.) Take-over: Backed by artillery and air force provided by the regular army, groups of well-
armed thugs took control over a settlement, using force against unarmed and frightened 
civilians. The members of other ethnic groups were rounded up and intimidated at best, or 
massacred at worst. In both cases, looting and robbing took place.  
2.) Carnival: Becoming the absolute masters of the area, the gangs engaged in carnivals of 
looting and destruction, as well as raping, torturing and murdering. Some of the local 
population joined in, opportunistically stealing the property of their neighbours who were 
either killed or chased away. 
3.) Revenge: Many victims joined similar gangs, composed of their co-ethnics. Seeking 
revenge and compensation for the stolen and destroyed property, they attacked villages 
inhabited by members of the same ethnic group to which the gang that attacked them 
belonged to, opening a new circle in the endless spiral of violence. 
4.) Occupation and desertion: With all people of other ethnic groups gone, and with little left 
to loot, gangs started to terrorise the people of their own ethnicity. Profiteering completely 
pushed away the political aims of the war and openly became a prime concern. Corruption 
and nepotism spread, harming the war effort. Ordinary people tried to migrate to a safer place, 
leaving their villages and towns under the control of fanatics, criminals, murderous drunks 
and revenge-seekers. 
 Assets of local industries and agricultural cooperatives were also stripped and sold off. 
For example, when Serbian forces took over the town of Prijedor, tens of electric motors, 
assembly lines, and other valuable objects disappeared from the Ljubija mine outside Prijedor 
and from other local enterprises, effectively closing them down and leaving local Serbs 
practically without any employment possibility. In the first months after the Serbian take-
over, at least six thousand heads of cattle were stolen and sent to Serbia.19 
 Looting and plundering were not the only ways to make money at the expense of 
victims. When non-Serbs were being expelled from Bijelina, they had to pay 500 German 
Marks per person to phoney travel agencies, which were organising one-way "excursions" to 
the Serbian-Hungarian border.20 In Bosanska Raca, Arkan's forces controlled the only bridge 
                                                          
18 Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,''' pp. 53-57. 
19 Judah, The Serbs, pp. 254-255. 
20 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part IV: Analysis of Reported 
Paramilitary Activity by Geographic Location, Section A: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bijelina county). 
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over the river Sava. Everyone who wanted to cross the bridge into Serbia had to pay between 
500 and 800 DM. Similarly, on the river Drina, which forms a larger part of the border 
between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Serbs operated small boats which would take 
refugees across for 1,000 DM per person.21 Numerous gangs run facilities in which captured 
women were kept as sex slaves and were subject to indescribably inhuman treatment. Many 
women kept there were killed.22  
 In many places, people who were chased from their homes had to sign documents that 
they "voluntarily renounce" all of their property and present it to the very people who were 
forcing them to leave at a gunpoint.23 Often, people were kept as prisoners until the ransom 
was paid for them. In Zvornik, 174 Muslim men were kept, tortured and beaten, until a 
ransom of 2,000 DM was paid for each of them.24 The soldiers of the Croatian army (even of 
the regular one) often supplemented their incomes by stealing (Croats described it as 
"requisition") vehicles from the Muslim refugees, entering Croatia.25 Humanitarian aid was 
another, similarly popular "supplement." Djordje Radovic, the head of a humanitarian aid 
organisation, operating in Sarajevo, complained about the difficulties one had to face if trying 
to get humanitarian relief into the besieged city. Eight per cent of the goods were confiscated 
by the Croatian army in Kiseljak (Croat-held town on the western edge of Sarajevo), thirty-
three by the Serbs in Ilidza (neighbouring Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo), twenty per cent by 
the Bosnian army, and twenty per cent were taken for the Bosnian state reserve. Thus, less 
than 20% of goods reached the people they were supposed to. Radovic's explanation was that 
the conflict was simply "a war of criminals" in which logic was impossible to find.26  
 Of course, as we know from history, looting is an almost regular side-effect of any 
war, and is inevitable when mercenaries and paramilitary units are involved in the fighting. 
Looting is therefore far from being a sufficient proof that Yugoslav wars were not “ethnic 
wars.” Far more important is the fact that the enemies, allegedly defined strictly according to 
ethnic criteria, traded with each other, and formed and broke military alliances according to 
temporary needs of individual units, and not always consistent with stated military objectives 
                                                          
21 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part IV: Analysis of Reported 
Paramilitary Activity by Geographic Location, Section A: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosanska Raca). 
22 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part IV: Analysis of Reported 
Paramilitary Activity by Geographic Location, Section A: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo county). 
23 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part IV: Analysis of Reported 
Paramilitary Activity by Geographic Location, Section A: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Zvornik county), Judah, The 
Serbs, p. 204. 
24 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III. A: Special Forces, Part IV: Analysis of Reported 
Paramilitary Activity by Geographic Location, Section A: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Zvornik county). 
25 Judah, The Serbs, p. 209. 
26 Ibid., pp. 251-252. 
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of "their" side. Numerous fighters also fought in the "enemy" units against their "own" 
nations. As Woodward states, individual enrichment and political aspirations were far more 
important than protection of national interests. The military strategy alone shows that war was 
not fought because of ethnic hatred or even to conquer the territory a given side claimed on 
account of alleged historic or ethnic rights. Most often armies fought in order to conquer 
towns or regions of significant strategic or economic importance, and not so much for control 
over territories where their co-nationals lived.27 Rather than "liberating" their historic 
territories, warring armies often targeted oil depots, factories, warehouses, electric power 
plants, mines and similar. Irrational "ethnic" war most often followed a surprisingly rational 
pattern. 
 Almost from the very beginning of the war in Bosnia certain areas were marked off as 
zones for free trading and black-marketeering, and were thus largely spared the horrors of the 
war. One such area was the Muslim-populated Cazinska Krajina, ruled by Fikret Abdic, 
former head of the local food-producing giant Agrokomerc. Serb general Djordje Djukic, 
stationed in western Bosnia, said that for 18 months during 1993 and 1994, army units under 
his command were supplied exclusively with the fuel, bought in Croatia and transported 
through Cazinska Krajina.28  
 A similar arrangement was made in regard to the Tuzla region. Tuzla is a town in 
north-east Bosnia, roughly 50 kilometres away from both Serbia and Croatia. Through the 
large part of the war, it was almost completely surrounded by Serb forces, which nevertheless 
never tried to take it. The town suffered virtually no bombardment, in sharp contrast to other 
besieged cities. The reason was that Tuzla was one of the most important points where all 
conflicting sides traded with each other.29 In the summer of 1993, when the fighting between 
Croat and Muslim armies started, the Croat forces cut the only road connecting Tuzla with the 
rest of the government-held territory. In theory therefore, Tuzla was completely surrounded 
by enemies who wanted either to take it over, or to starve it into submission. Yet, while it was 
true that life for the people in Tuzla became much harder, lack of food never seemed to be a 
problem. Even Macedonian cigarettes never disappeared from the town's market, obviously 
thanks to a regular supply across the enemy lines. The only effect the complete encirclement 
                                                          
27 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1995, pp. 271-272. 
28 Stevan L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International 
Intervention, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 138. 
29 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III: The Military Structure, Strategy and Tactics of the Warring 
Factions, Part II: Summary and Conclusions. 
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had was that the prices went up, increasing the profit of alleged crazed nationalists, 
supposedly caring only about driving the Muslims out of Tuzla.30 
 Vares and Ilijas are two neighbouring small towns, about 40 kilometres north of 
Sarajevo. Vares was held by Croats and Ilijas by Serbs. Nevertheless these two towns entered 
into a very comfortable business relationship early in the war, trading cigarettes, sugar, oil, 
flour and other products. When UNHCR officials came to Vares to inquire how much 
humanitarian aid needed to be delivered to the town, local officials refused the offer, saying 
that they had more than enough supplies of their own. The last thing they needed was 
humanitarian aid coming into the town, removing their monopoly and lowering the prices.31 
 In Sarajevo, business followed a similar pattern. Kiseljak is a majority Croat town on 
the edge of Sarajevo and at the time was a seat of the Bosnian Croat army. Throughout the 
war, Croats in Kiseljak traded both with people in Sarajevo and with the Serbs besieging it. 
Serbs would sell the goods to Croats, who would add their commission and sell them further 
to the Muslim mafia in Sarajevo, who were operating a cartel system which kept the prices in 
the city astronomical.32 
 Serbs and Muslims often traded without Croats as middlemen. In the besieged 
Srebrenica, Naser Oric, the undisputed lord of the city, monopolised the black market, 
supplied exclusively by Serbian goods and confiscated humanitarian aid. Caravans of horses 
would track over Zlovrh mountain bringing salt, cigarettes, razor blades, oil, flour, fuel, tooth 
paste, soap and other goods to Srebrenica.33 Oric, to some a hero who defended Srebrenica for 
three years, and a vicious and ruthless gangster to others, used to be Milosevic's personal 
bodyguard before the war. Oric's men terrorised civilians in the city, allegedly killing one 
family because one of Oric's officers fancied their house for himself. In April 1994, three 
teenage Muslim girls escaped from Srebrenica, passed on foot through a minefield and 
surrendered to the Serbs, explaining that they had been gang-raped by Oric's men.34  
 Trade often had a decisive impact on who was to fight whom. Despite the fact that the 
Croatian Defence Council and the Bosnian government forces fought together in defence of 
Sarajevo, Serbs seldom shelled the positions defended by Croat units who were their trading 
partners.35 When in May 1992, government forces tried to break the siege of Sarajevo by 
                                                          
30 Judah, The Serbs, pp. 247-248. 
31 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
32 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 295-296. 
33 Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 243-244. 
34 Ibid., p. 245. 
35 Commission of Experts, Final Report, Annex III: The Military Structure, Strategy and Tactics of the Warring 
Factions, Section L: The Territorial Defence Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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attacking Serb forces from behind, they were fought back and compelled to retreat not by the 
Serbs, but by their nominal Croatian allies from Kiseljak, who would hate to see a nice 
business arrangement go to waste (it should be reminded that this was five months before the 
first clashes between the Croat and Muslim armies, and almost a year before the outbreak of a 
full-scale war in April 1993).36 Silber and Little trace the origin of the Croat-Muslim conflict 
to a mafia dispute over oil smuggling. The conflict erupted on October 25, 1992, in the town 
of Prozor in central Bosnia. It is true that the tensions were already running high in the region, 
after the territories, which Croats perceived as "theirs," started to fill up with Muslim 
refugees. Yet the conflict erupted only when two rival mafia gangs, one Croatian and the 
other Muslim, tried to eliminate each other and acquire a full monopoly over the fuel trade in 
central Bosnia. The mafia clash soon became viewed as an "ethnic" conflict making its origin 
and essence completely irrelevant and opening another bloody and entirely unnecessary 
chapter in the Yugoslav drama.37 
  The trade, which most directly revealed the "non-ethnic" face of the war in 
Yugoslavia, was the arms trade. Since Serbs "inherited" the lion's share of the weaponry of 
the former Yugoslav People's Army, they were most often selling, while Croats and Muslim 
were lining up as their customers. The fact that these same weapons were later used by Croat 
and Muslim units in their attacks on Serbian positions was no obstacle whatsoever.38 Business 
was exceptionally lively in Cazinska Krajina. A commander of one of the Croat units bought 
an anti-aircraft gun from a Serb. When he told him that he was going to use the gun against 
Serbs, his supplier answered that he could not care less.39 Serbs from Kninska Krajina (Serb-
occupied part of Croatia) did not sell weapons only to Fikret Abdic (their business partner in 
whose company Agrokomerc they processed their crops), but also to the Fifth Corps of the 
Bosnian Government Army and therefore to the enemy of their fellow Serbs in Bosnia.40  
 A senior officer from the Bosnian Serb army in Ilijas sold a few pieces of heavy 
artillery to the nearby Muslim village. After that he packed his belongings and moved to 
Serbia with his family.41 Sudetic, who spent a lot of time in Bosnia during the war, described 
the illegal gun market in a bar of a hotel near the Mehmed Pasha bridge in Visegrad. The 
market was operating in the fall and winter of 1991, therefore during the war in Croatia, but 
before the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia. The sellers were people from Radovan Karadzic's 
                                                          
36 Judah, The Serbs, pp. 206-207. 
37 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 293-294. 
38 Mueller, "The Banality of  'Ethnic War,'" pp. 57-58. 
39 Judah, The Serbs, p. 243. 
40 Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 138. 
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Serbian Democratic Party, and the buyers "prominent" local Muslims, most often with 
criminal past, who would buy arms from Serbs and then sell them on to other local Muslims.42 
It is impossible to assume that the local representatives of Karadzic's party could not imagine 
that the Muslims would soon be using these same weapons against their fellow-Serbs. This 
only shows again that for many people involved, personal gains had an absolute priority over 
alleged national ones. 
The first weapons smuggling channels in Bosnia-Herzegovina were set up by the 
KOS, Counter – Intelligence Service of the Yugoslav People’s Army. KOS leaders made an 
agreement with the Bosnian Defense Minister (a Muslim by origin) not to interfere with the 
shipment of weapons sent from Serbia through Bosnia to Serbian-held territories in Croatia. 
In return, the secret service deflected some of the weapons to Bosnian Muslim army-in-the-
making. Occasionally, a police patrol not instructed to let the transports through intercepted 
trucks loaded with weapons (for example, on the night of 9 April 1992 three trucks, 
transporting 1,119 automatic rifles were stopped), but as soon as the word got to the Minister 
or his associates, the “misunderstanding” was cleared up.43 
 Judah writes that several hundred million German Marks were made through arms 
trade. But this was not the only way inventive "businesspersons" with abundance of weapons 
could make money. In Herzegovina, Croat units rented tanks from the Serbs for 1,000 DM per 
day, when they were fighting with Muslims. In turn, during the Croat-Muslim clashes in 
Mostar, Muslims paid Serbian units to shell Croat positions. Serbs, however, proved to be 
exceptional entrepreneurs and doubled the profit by warning Croats to clear out in exchange 
for a certain fee, before shelling their positions with exactly the number of projectiles the 
Muslims had paid for.44 
 
Emergence of Balkan Smuggling Channels 
 
The development of the smuggling channels in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo was 
influenced by specific circumstances, non-existent in the other former Yugoslav republics and 
even less so in other transitional countries. The war in which the Croatian, Bosnian Muslim 
and Kosovo Albanian armies were fighting against a militarily superior and better armed 
adversary contributed to the creation of a socio-political environment where smuggling 
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43 Judah, The Serbs, pp. 193-194. 
44 Ibid., pp. 249-250. 
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(especially of weapons) was not perceived as harmful to the interests of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Kosovo. On the contrary, smuggling came to be regarded as essential for 
their survival and was thus viewed by majority of people as a state-building, rather than as a 
criminal act. In Serbia and Montenegro, smuggling channels were similarly set up and run by 
state organs, especially the secret services. The only difference was that here, the primary 
object of illegal trade was oil. The Serbian war machine in Bosnia desperately depended on 
smuggled fuel, without which it would have been brought to a standstill. Three main channels 
for smuggling oil into Serbia and Montenegro were opened soon after the imposition of 
sanctions:  
• One smuggling channel (across the lake Skadar between Montenegro and Albania) was 
run by Montenegrin mafia in close cooperation with authorities in Podgorica. 
• The second channel was a result of the joint cooperation between agents of Serbian State 
Security Service and a few selected criminal gangs, which were given “import licenses” by 
corrupt state officials. It involved “imports” of oil from Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania.45 
• By far the biggest was the Serbian state-run channel, which involved a number of high 
officials, including one of Serbian Prime Ministers and one of Deputy Federal Prime 
Ministers from Milosevic’s period. The company Progres Trade occupied the central place in 
this smuggling scheme. Progres Trade exported grain to Russia, bartering it directly for 
Russian oil. No hard currency transactions were involved to avoid the danger of funds being 
seized by the international financial watchdogs. According to the estimates, the values of the 
exchange were between $100 and 250 million per year. The profits were used for financing 
the army, police, secret service, state-run media and for subsidizing state-run companies, but 
significant part also went in pockets of those involved in the transaction.46 
 
Macedonia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria constituted the “outer ring” of the smuggling 
networks, which were established in the Balkans in the first half of the 1990s. Due to the 
specifics of the smuggling channels, these countries could not remain isolated from the illegal 
trade on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and they played the role of mediators in the 
trans-national system of smuggling and trafficking in violation of international sanctions. The 
proximity to the war zone and the possibilities the sanction-busting offered to the well-placed 
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individuals and groups led to the rapid development of smuggling and other illegal activities, 
and to the proliferation of organized crime in Macedonia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. 
It should be noted, however, that these countries in their own turn became important 
centers of international smuggling schemes, stimulated both by the supranational processes of 
the globalization of organized crime, and by the national political and economic changes, 
occurring during the transition to democracy and market economy.  
 
The smuggling channels, set up semi-officially with the knowledge, if not even active 
participation of the highest state officials, were soon “privatised” by certain well-placed 
individuals and groups within or closely connected to the ruling elites. Smuggling and illicit 
trade started to seriously undermine the normal functioning of the states. The channels 
initially established for smuggling of weapons and oil were expanded to include other goods, 
such as drugs, stolen vehicles, cigarettes, alcohol and other commodities. Part of the profits 
from the drug trade was regularly used for buying weapons, but the large part usually ended 
on private accounts of the people involved in the smuggling. The origins of the constantly 
growing Balkan “trade in human beings” can also be traced to the 1992-1995 periods and to 
the lucrative business of “assisting” refugees to escape from the war zones to safety.  
 
 
Trans-Border Crime: The Root Cause of Instability in the Balkans 
 
The gradual end of armed conflicts in the Western Balkans and termination of sanctions 
against the FR Yugoslavia have drastically reshaped the geography of the regional smuggling 
networks. Trade with weapons and oil, previously the most sought after commodities, 
diminished dramatically, and gave way to a progressively expanding illegal trade with illicit 
drugs, excise goods (most notably cigarettes) and human beings. The reorientation towards 
new “commodities” was paralleled with the conclusion of transition from “state-sponsored” to 
mafia-run smuggling. Apart from the increase in large-scale smuggling, there was also the 
rapid growth of the small-scale, or “suitcase” smuggling in all countries of the region, due to 
the widespread impoverishment, the high prices of legally imported commodities, and weak 
law enforcement.   
 
Cigarette smuggling became one of the most profitable illegal activities in the Balkans. It 
involves both locally produced cigarettes and major international brands. The schemes for 
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smuggling locally produced cigarettes usually involve “export” to a neighbouring country, 
followed by illegal transport of these same cigarettes back into the country of origin. Cigarette 
smuggling prospered because of the existence of several borders in the region, which were ill-
protected for various reasons (border between Croatia and the Croat-populated Herzegovina, 
border between Serbia and the Serb-populated Republika Srpska, and the border between 
Serbia and post-1999 Kosovo). Another popular customs fraud, used in cigarette smuggling, 
is to present cigarettes as being produced in a (real or fake) domestic factory, and not abroad 
as it is really the case.  
 
Southeast Europe is also a natural bridge between Middle Eastern and Central Asian drug 
producers and West European drug consumers. The heroin produced in Afghanistan travels 
through Iran to Turkey, where it is refined, and then through Bulgaria to other regional 
countries, from where it is distributed to Western Europe. One of the consequences of the war 
in former Yugoslavia was that now the illegal drug trade encompasses all the countries in the 
region. Political instability, poverty, corruption, insufficient and poorly equipped security 
forces and ill-guarded, porous borders made the region ideal for drug smuggling. 
The drug trade enabled the international organized crime (especially the Italian mafia, 
and Turkish and Middle Eastern drug smuggling networks) to establish its presence in the 
region, adding further incentive to the vicious circle in which corruption, organized crime and 
instability feed each other. According to Interpol estimates, over 80 percent of the heroin, sold 
in the EU, have traveled through the Balkans. Some of the regional countries, most notably 
Croatia and Albania, also became the most important European points of entry for the South 
American cocaine. Southeast Europe itself has also turned into an important drug producing 
region, especially of cannabis and opium poppies, and laboratories for production of synthetic 
drugs have also appeared.  
Although drug smuggling and drug abuse sharply increased in all regional countries, 
Kosovo represents the most drastic case. After becoming de facto independent from 
Yugoslavia in 1999, Kosovo reaffirmed its role as the center of Southeast European drug 
smuggling networks. The International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association estimates 
that the Kosovo mafia handles between four and a half and five tons of heroin monthly now, 
which is more than double the amount before the 1999 war.47  
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The most obvious example of how big is the influence of drug smuggling and 
organized crime on instability and how quickly they can trigger a conflict, which can then be 
wrongly perceived as ethnic, is Macedonia. The 2001 conflict in Macedonia was triggered by 
a struggle over the full control of the growing Albanian-run criminal empire in western 
Macedonia. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, western Macedonia, where majority of 
Macedonian Albanians live, has been a drug-smuggling center since at least the 1970s. A 
crucial factor facilitating the proliferation of smuggling in this part of the country in recent 
years was the deliberate decision of the VMRO – DPA (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization and Democratic Party of Albanians) government not to patrol the border area 
after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force in 1999. This decision, justified as a 
precautionary and confidence-building policy in a sensitive area, gives ground to allegations 
that the two ruling parties were in the least passively involved in illegal traffic across the 
border. The center of Macedonian drug and arms smuggling, the village of Tanusevci, became 
a virtual “free territory,” together with some other villages and areas along the Macedonian 
border with Kosovo. Tanusevci is an Albanian-populated mountain village, located exactly at 
the border between Macedonia and Kosovo, in which the 2001 fighting has started. During 
the Kosovo conflict, Tanusevci was used as one of the most important arms depots of the 
KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), and before that, it was widely believed to be one of the 
centers for smuggling of drugs to and from Albania and Kosovo. Not unimportantly, 
Tanusevci is also the home village of Xhavit Hasani, one of the founding members of the 
KLA and one of its commanders. Aracinovo, another hot-spot of the 2001 crisis, has also 
been considered for a long time to be a center for drug, cigarette and arms smuggling. The 
first outbreaks of violence in Macedonia were provoked by a “violation” of the “free status” 
of Tanusevci, when Macedonian police unit was dispatched to the village in response to the 
detention of a Macedonian television news crew by uniformed Albanian guerillas.48  
The stable political environment and the rule of law hinder the proliferation of 
smuggling and other illegal activities. In a country like Macedonia, with exceptionally high 
level of mistrust between various ethnic communities and in a dire economic situation, it was 
relatively easy for the Albanian rebels-cum-smugglers to escalate the situation marked with 
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tensions and distrust into an armed conflict, thus creating a perfect environment for criminal 
activities.49  
 
Illegal trafficking in people has been also growing with alarming speed in the region. It 
includes the transfer of illegal immigrants, women to be engaged in prostitution, labor force to 
work under inhuman conditions, trafficking in children, and illegal adoptions at exorbitant 
prices.  
Southeast Europe is one of the most important transit regions for illegal immigrants 
from Turkey, China, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern 
and Asian countries on their way to the EU. It is also an important source region, with 
Romanians, Albanians and Roma being among the most numerous groups of illegal 
immigrants in the EU.  
One of the reasons for the exceptionally fast growth of the human trafficking business 
is that profits are incomparably higher than risks and costs involved. Unlike drug smuggling, 
human trafficking is considered in most countries as a minor offence which carries light 
sentences. No special equipment is needed and no organized network for distribution (like in 
the case of drugs) is essential. In case of danger, the immigrants (who pay in advance for the 
“service”) can be easily abandoned by their guides, and in practice, they often are.  
Trafficking of illegal immigrants through Southeast Europe seems to be organized by 
the same groups who were previously engaged in the smuggling of weapons and drugs or in 
“assisting” refugees to reach safety for a price during the war. Similarly, the same routes are 
being used and the same partners from the other side of the border are involved. This seems to 
be especially the case in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. In Montenegro and Albania, 
the traffic of illegal immigrants across the Adriatic Sea to Italy is organized by the same 
people who are engaged in smuggling of drugs and cigarettes to Italy. According to the 
estimates, the organizers of trafficking of illegal immigrants to the EU earn over $3 billion per 
year.50  
 Trafficking in women and girls is an even more alarming and disturbing aspect of the 
trafficking in human beings. In most cases, it involves coercion, violence and humiliation of 
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victims. Trafficked women and girls are often forced into prostitution, held in slave-like 
conditions, and repeatedly raped, brutalised, denied food, water, sleep and medical care, and 
sold like property by one brothel owner or trafficker to another. Many of them are girls under 
18 years of age, and numerous were either tricked to leave their homes (with false promises of 
well-paid employment or marriage) or kidnapped. In Albania and Kosovo, cases when 
families sold their own daughters or sisters to traffickers were registered. By various 
estimates, hundreds of thousands of women and girls are trafficked across European borders 
every year.51 In most cases, women and girls from East Europe are trafficked to the EU, but 
many (especially from the former Soviet Union) are trafficked also to other Eastern European 
countries and “employed” in sex industry there. Often, the trafficked girls are forced into 
prostitution in Eastern European countries for a certain period while on their way to the EU. 
Trafficking in women and girls again show how connected are organised crime and 
instability. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo are all characterised by persistent 
ethnic tensions, instability, weak state institutions, ineffective law-enforcement and 
consequently, significant number of international troops are present there to preserve peace, 
law and order. Unfortunately, the large international presence also has its negative side-
effects and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo all became the most important 
regional destination countries for trafficked women and girls. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In May 2004, Antonina Zhelyazkova and her team conducted a field study in Bosnia. In the 
town of Kakanj, they talked with a respondent, a Bosnian Muslim by ethno-religious origin. 
He talked about the Bosnian Nouveaux-Riches, describing them as marauders and 
bloodsuckers. “They looted, plundered and became millionaires during the war. They 
profiteered from everything – they sold weapons to the Serbs and the Croats to kill us. Or vice 
versa… Fuel, foods, property… they sold our blood… we were dying from starvation and 
thirst, while they are now laundering money to make even greater fortunes,” he told the team. 
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“They are Muslims but I hate them just as much … one day they’ll pay for it dearly,” he 
concluded.52  
His last sentence is perhaps the best possible illustration about what were, are and will 
continue to be the real root causes of instability in the Balkans. It is true that ethnic tensions, 
mistrust among various ethnic and religious groups and intolerance towards the “other” all 
continue to run exceptionally high in all of the former Yugoslavia successor states. But what 
really keeps on fuelling the hatred and mistrust, what really makes the instability so persistent 
are the continuous poverty and lack of perspectives the ordinary citizens are faced with. When 
they compare their own situation with the obvious wealth and “above the law” status the 
criminals and war profiteers are enjoying, the majority of ordinary citizens in most of the 
former Yugoslavia cannot but continue to feel that they are threatened and exploited by 
someone else, just as they did before the outbreak of wars in 1990s. Today, just like 15 years 
ago, this is a recipe for disaster. 
Smuggling and other forms of trans-border crime, as well as the corruption they 
generated, have been among the most important obstacles to the successful transition towards 
democracy and market economy, and have substantially hampered numerous political, 
economic and legal reforms. A vicious circle was formed where corruption generated more 
opportunities for smuggling and other forms of organized crime, these generated instability 
and created fertile ground for eruption of conflicts, and these in turn hindered efforts to stem 
corruption.  
By the end of the year 2000, governments of all regional countries became involved in 
effort to counter smuggling and corruption. Apart from several important political changes in 
the region, one of the most important reasons for such development was the ever increasing 
international pressure on regional governments to do more to curb smuggling and corruption. 
Numerous special counter-smuggling and counter-trafficking police units were established. A 
number of new laws, dealing specifically with smuggling and trafficking were adopted and 
penalties for perpetrators of these acts increased. Work of customs officers and border police 
was assessed and in some countries, some of the necessary reforms and changes were 
undertaken. Hopefully, the rest will follow soon. In many regional countries, drug seizures, 
for example, sharply increased as a result. Even more important is the fact that regional and 
international cooperation in the fight against trans-border crime in the region is constantly 
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increasing, and that regional cooperation in countering smuggling and trafficking also 
improved.  
Yet, this is only the beginning and given the scope and persistence of the problem, 
there is still an enormous task lying ahead. The lack of clear strategy and genuine 
commitment of the EU to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans means that the most 
important incentive, which for example pushed Bulgaria considerably forward in its 
transition, has not been employed. Apart from this, the international community, especially 
the international forces, present in the most critical regional hot-spots (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Kosovo) most often neglect or diminish the danger of the organized criminal 
structures in the region, preferring to tolerate their activity for the sake of preservation of 
uneasy and unstable balance between the peace and the conflict. In this way, stability became 
a hostage of those, who actually represent the root cause of instability itself.  
The open partnership between the criminal structures and the authorities in the Balkan 
states, which characterised the bigger part of the 1990s and which pushed the region into a 
series of wars and conflicts today no longer exists. Its legacy, however, can still be felt. 
Corruption, weak state institutions, porous borders, and even the existence of several quasi-
states (Republika Srpska, Kosovo) continue to threaten the stability of the whole region, and 
organized crime continues to represent the roots of these threats. Multi-ethnic, tolerant and 
prosperous Balkans will some day make a beautiful flower indeed. But before we can enjoy 
the blossom, we have to take care of the root. 
